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NEHA JAIN*
Individual Responsibility for Mass Atrocity: In Search
of a Concept of Perpetrationt
International criminal law lacks a coherent account of individual
responsibility. This failure is due to the inability of international
tribunals to capture the distinctive nature of individual responsibility
for crimes that are collective by their very nature. Specifically, they
have misunderstood the nature of the collective action or framework
that makes these crimes possible, and for which liability can be attrib-
uted to intellectual authors and leaders. In this paper, I draw on the
insights of comparative law and methodology to propose a new doc-
trine of perpetration that reflects the role and function of high level
participants in mass atrocity while simultaneously situating them
within the political and social climate that renders these crimes possi-
ble. This new doctrine is developed through a novel approach which
combines and restructures divergent theoretical perspectives on attri-
bution of responsibility in the English and German domestic criminal
law systems as major representatives of the common law and civil law
systems. At the same time, it harnesses social science literature to
identify and capture, in doctrinal terms, the unique circumstances in
which mass atrocity occurs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mass atrocity has been an unfortunately persistent occurrence
throughout human history; the phenomenon of holding individuals
criminally responsible for its commission is a relatively recent devel-
opment.' "Crimes against international law are committed by men,
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1. On the development of collective and individual criminal responsibility in in-
ternational law, see, e.g., Timothy MacCormack, Selective Approach to Atrocity: War
Crimes and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. Rev. 681
(1996-1997); ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR
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not by abstract entities and only by punishing individuals who com-
mit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced" 2-this ringing pronouncement by the International Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg has become a talisman for international
criminal lawyers ever since the historic trials conducted after World
War II.3 The specter of collective guilt has sought to be banished with
repeated incantations of the principle of individual responsibility by
international tribunals and scholars.4 The puzzle of the collective,
however, endures: like an unloved catchy tune, it lingers in the crev-
ices of modes of responsibility fashioned by tribunals. Who should be
considered the perpetrator of a crime such as genocide -an offense
that necessarily involves participation by several hundreds of indi-
viduals? How can individual responsibility reflect the multifarious
ways in which various persons contribute to it? Should intellectual
authors of a genocidal policy be held to account as perpetrators, or
should they also be labeled accessories, and punished accordingly?
VIoLATIoNs OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 15-39 (2003); Albin Eser, Individ-
ual Criminal Responsibility, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COUtT: A COMMENTARY 767, 774-78 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
2. France v. Goering, 22 I.M.T. 411, 466 (1946).
3. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations:
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 82, 85 (2005); Gerry Simpson, Men and
Abstract Entities: Individual Responsibility and Collective Guilt in International
Criminal Law, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 69, 73 (Andr6
Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009). It should be noted though that this
affirmation coincides both with an argument that the responsibility may not lie exclu-
sively with the individual, but also with the State, and of late, with increasing
demands for organizational responsibility for international crimes. See, e.g., Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and Interna-
tional Responsibility of the State, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1085 (A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & JRWD Jones eds.,
2002); Andrew Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individ-
ual to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 899
(2008).
4. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25(2), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); The Secretary-General, Report of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808,
53, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/25704 (May 3, 1993) ("Report of the
Secretary-General"); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chambers
Judgment 186 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Antonio
Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998).
Some scholars have taken a more nuanced view of the relationship between guilt and
responsibility, holding that collective guilt (in contrast with collective responsibility)
can be an appropriate response to collective wrongdoing: George Fletcher, Collective
Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAw 163, 168-78
(2004). Others would not go so far as to advocate collective guilt, but instead favor
collective sanctions: Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment:
The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 539, 576-77 (2005); Mark
Drumbl, Pluralizing International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1315-22
(2005).
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One could argue that the characterization is hardly of any conse-
quence-after all, the offender is held accountable in either case, and
in the absence of any mandatory mitigation of sentences for accesso-
ries, punished equally. Indeed, quite a few domestic criminal law
systems consider the distinction between principals and accessories
to be largely redundant.5 I argue that a sophisticated understanding
of the status of the accused in relation to the offense committed is
crucial for the ascription of responsibility. Statements of responsibil-
ity perform an expressive function: the censure of the conduct of the
accused. This expression, however, is not confined to evaluating sim-
ply whether the accused is innocent or guilty, but also what exactly
he is guilty of.6 The rules of criminal responsibility would fulfil this
essential communicative function only if they accurately express 7 the
nature of the censure, its appropriate target, and the conditions
under which it is deserved.8 A theory of responsibility must therefore
be capable of representing, as accurately as possible, both the nature
of the crime in question as well as how the accused is connected to its
commission.9
Indeed, it is precisely this motivation for accurately reflecting
the accused's role in the commission of mass atrocity that has led
tribunals to develop the two competing doctrines of Joint Criminal
Enterprise (JCE) on the one hand, and indirect perpetration and co-
perpetration on the other. JCE is largely a common law influenced
doctrine, with close analogues in the doctrine of joint enterprise in
English law1 0 and the Pinkerton conspiracy doctrine in U.S. law." It
has been in vogue for much of the existence of the ad hoc criminal
5. For instance, "formal unitary systems" such as Denmark and Italy do not rec-
ognize the distinction between principal and secondary responsibility, whereas
"functional unitary systems" like Austria and Poland formally distinguish between
the two but do not consider secondary responsibility to be derivative in nature: Hitc
TOR OLASoLO, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY
LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 18-19 nn.35-37 (2010). In the
United States, the Model Penal Code as well as the majority of States have aban-
doned the traditional common law distinctions between principals and accessories:
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 706-08 (2010). English criminal law treats the prin-
cipal and the accomplice identically for the purposes of punishment in that they are
both guilty of the full offense, but the distinction between the two still has some lim-
ited significance: A.P. SIMESTER ET AL., SIMESTER AND SULLIvAN'S CRIMINAL LAw:
THEORY AND DOCTRINE 206 (2010).
6. VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 80 (2005).
7. Gardner holds that rules of responsibility, in the relevant sense, are ascriptive
rather than normative. They are therefore directed towards making judgments on
whether and how we should count what people have done more accurate. See John
Gardner, Criminal Law and the Uses of Theory: A Reply to Laing, 14 OxFoRD J. LEGAL
STuD. 217, 220 (1994).
8. TADROS, supra note 6, at 3.
9. For recent powerful counterarguments to this position, see James G. Stewart,
The End of 'Modes of Liability' for International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L . 165,
211-13 (2012).
10. For a succinct account of the doctrine of joint enterprise in English law, see
A.P. Simester, The Mental Element in Complicity, 122 L.Q. REV. 578 (2006); SIMESTER
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tribunals, especially the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR).12 Co-perpetration and indirect perpetration are
based on established modes of responsibility in German criminal law
and are currently the favored doctrines at the International Criminal
Court (ICC).'s Both doctrines have come under considerable criti-
cism, for reasons ranging from the methodological to the
substantive.14 With the recent Concurring Opinion of Judge Wyn-
gaert in Ngudjolo,15 the status of indirect and co-perpetration at the
ICC has been called into question. Having never been on a firm foot-
ing to begin with, a coherent account of perpetration responsibility
for international crimes seems more precarious than ever.
In this Article, I take up the challenge of constructing a theory of
perpetration that reflects the concerns at the core of responsibility
doctrines in highly theorized domestic criminal law systems, and
which is simultaneously attuned to the unique features of interna-
tional crimes. I do so by first identifying elements that distinguish
international crimes from their domestic counterparts (Part II). I
then examine doctrines of principal responsibility in English criminal
law (Part III), German criminal law (Part IV) and the jurisprudence
of the ICC (Part V), to assess whether one can build a case for a more
capacious concept of principalship for international crimes by draw-
ing on these doctrines (Part VI).
ET AL., supra note 5, at 233-44; ANDREw ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
420-27 (2009).
11. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
12. For an excellent analysis of the prominence of JCE at the ad hoc tribunals, see
generally GIDEON BOAS, JAMES BISCHOFF & NATALIE REID, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw PRACTITIONER LIBRARY, VOL I: FORMS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL LAW 8-141 (2007); William Schabas, The ICTY at Ten: A Critical Assessment of
the Major Rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal Over the Past Decade: Mens
Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 1032 (2003); Nicola Piacente, Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise
Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial Policy, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 446 (2004).
13. On the recent ascendance of the doctrines at the ICC and their background in
German criminal law, see Florian Jessberger & Julia Geneuss, On the Application of
a Theory of Indirect Perpetration in Al Bashir: German Doctrine at the Hague?, 6 J.
INTL. CRIM. JUSTICE 853 (2008); Harmen G. van der Wilt, The Continuous Quest for
Proper Modes of Criminal Responsibility, 7 J. INTL GRIM. JUSTICE 307 (2009).
14. On JCE, see Danner & Martinez, supra note 3; Jens Ohlin, Three Conceptual
Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L GRIM. JUSTICE 69
(2007); Mohamed Badar, "Just Convict Everyone!"-Joint Perpetration: From Tadic to
Stakic and Back Again, 6 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 293 (2006). On indirect perpetration and
co-perpetration, see Jessberger & Geneuss, supra note 13, at 868; compare with Ger-
hard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 953, 963-64 (2007) (stating that while perpetration by means is recog-
nized in major legal systems, it had not been regulated by international criminal law
instruments or courts prior to the Rome Statute).
15. Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den
Wyngaert (ICC Trial Chamber II, Dec. 18, 2012).
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A word on methodology is in order here: I choose to focus on En-
glish and German criminal law for several reasons. First, in the field
of domestic criminal laws, these legal systems constitute two of the
most sophisticated and influential systems representing the common
law and civil law worlds respectively. Second, existing modes of re-
sponsibility in international criminal law have borrowed heavily from
these systems in their jurisprudence. Third, my task is not to advo-
cate the wholesale adoption of any doctrine in any particular legal
system, but rather to restructure and combine divergent theoretical
perspectives on perpetration responsibility in order to develop a suit-
able account of the criminal responsibility of senior and mid-level
participants in mass atrocity. The attempt, therefore, is to engage
fully with domestic criminal law principles while simultaneously cap-
turing the unique features of international crimes.
II. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
In order to formulate an appropriate concept of perpetration in
international criminal law, it is important to note the most important
markers of an international crime.
The most telling feature of an international crime as contrasted
with its domestic counterpart is that it is inherently collective in na-
ture, for the perpetrator as well as the victim.16 While the
perpetrator of a crime such as ethnic cleansing or waging aggressive
war is individually culpable, he invariably commits this crime on be-
half of, or in furtherance of, a collective criminal project, be it that of
a state or other authority.' 7 The hypothetical figure of the lone gd-
nocidaire hardly ever exists in practice: the perpetrator is part of and
acts within a social structure that influences his conduct and in con-
junction with other people.' 8 Similarly, the victims of international
crimes are also mostly chosen not based on their individual charac-
teristics, but because of their actual or perceived membership of a
collective.' 9 International crimes are also collective in the sense that
they are committed with the consciousness on the part of the individ-
ual perpetrator that he is part of a common project. Crimes such as
crimes against humanity that are committed as a systematic and
widespread attack against a civilian population cannot be understood
solely in terms of the mental state of each perpetrator. Rather, one
16. George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The
Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1514 (2002); Laurel E. Fletcher &
Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Jus-
tice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTs. Q. 573, 605 (2002).
17. Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law,
43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 56 (2007).
18. Id., at 56.
19. Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 4, at 571.
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must address the social structures and group solidarity that renders
them possible-whether that is based on fear of violence, ethnic ha-
tred, or religious intolerance.20
The second distinctive aspect of international crimes is that the
individual crimes do not deviate from, but conform to, the prevailing
social norm.21 In this sense, they are indeed "crimes of obedience" as
coined by Kelman: they are acts carried out under explicit instruc-
tions from makers of official policy, or at least in an environment in
which they are sponsored, expected or tolerated by them, and which
are considered illegal or immoral by the larger community. 22 This is
regardless of whether the crimes are also committed for personal mo-
tives or with zeal. 2 3 The perpetrator of an international crime acts
within a moral and cultural universe where his actions correspond to
the values of the group to which he belongs. He may conceive of him-
self as being in the right and working to prevent injustice or even in
self-defense. 24 Some authors go so far as to assert that in such a cli-
mate, it is paradoxically those who refuse to commit the crimes that
act in deviance to the social norm. Criminal law in these circum-
stances appears to be something that can only be adhered to by
exceptional individuals. 25
George Fletcher offers a slightly different account of this dimen-
sion of international crimes in terms of the denial of the perpetrator's
opportunity for self-correction. The moral climate of hate does not
cause the crime to be committed, but rather deprives people of their
second order capacity for self-restraint (from criminal conduct). The
perpetrator is subject to the world of the senses but always has the
capacity to choose the world of reason and let his conduct be governed
by the moral law. The circumstances in which he operates, however,
can make this exercise of choosing the moral order far more demand-
ing.2 6 It is for this reason that the dramatically different background,
which Carlos Nino terms "radical evil,"27 in which international
crimes are committed must be paid serious attention to in any theory
of responsibility for an international crime.
20. MARK J. OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY 187-88 (2009).
21. Andre Nollkaemper, Introduction, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY, supra note 3, at 1,
6; Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 Eun. J.
INT'L L. 561, 575 (2002); Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1541.
22. Herbert C. Kelman, The Policy Context of International Crimes, in SYSTEM
CRIMINALITY, supra note 3, at 26, 27.
23. Id., at 27.
24. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 396-97 (1999); Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide:
From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1221, 1243, 1245 (2000).
25. Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 4, at 568; Tallgren, supra note 21, at
573.
26. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1541-43.
27. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL vii (1996).
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Finally, a theory of perpetration for international crimes has to
be sensitive to the number and motivations of the participants in the
crime. It must recognize that these participants will be spatially and
temporally dispersed and that for this reason, unlike in domestic
crimes, a theory of responsibility cannot afford to focus solely on the
time and place where each individual offense (such as rape) constitut-
ing the overall crime (war crime) occurred. It should also be cautious
of simplifying the social, cultural, and structural forces that make
mass atrocity possible and resist the temptation to make all cases of
mass violence fit into a preconceived mold. International crimes can
take place in diverse organizational settings-they can be highly or-
ganized and rigidly hierarchical ones, or deliberately encourage
arbitrariness and spontaneity. 28
It is also important to keep in mind that the image of the partici-
pant as a soulless bureaucrat who is only "doing his job" as part of the
enterprise of mass atrocity2 9 presents only part of the truth about the
reality of mass atrocity. As academics have noted in their studies of
the phenomenon of mass atrocity, more often than not, there is a
"communal engagement with violence."30 Atrocity cannot be perpe-
trated on such a widespread basis unless it is accompanied by
vigorous participation by a very large number of ordinary people.3 '
While the calculating bureaucrat and the crazed ideological
killer represent two extremes of the kinds of actors in international
crimes, most perpetrators will display some or a combination of vari-
ous kinds of motives. 32 Mann even classifies perpetrators according
to their motives: ideological killers, bigoted killers, fearful killers, ca-
reerist killers, materialist killers, disciplined killers, comradely
killers, and bureaucratic killers.33 In fact, no case of mass atrocity
will have only one type of perpetrator.
These distinctive features of international crimes-their collec-
tive nature, conformity to the prevailing social norms, and
widespread participation by different levels of participants acting on
different motives-must be kept in mind while evaluating domestic
criminal law principles for constructing a theory of perpetration for
international crimes. We can now turn to this analysis by first consid-
ering principal responsibility in English criminal law.
28. Mark J. Osiel, Constructing Subversion in Argentina's Dirty War, 75 REPRE-
SENTATIONS 119, 127 (2001).
29. See Sloane, supra note 17, at 64.
30. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 605.
31. Drumbl, supra note 4, at 569; Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to En-
gagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1013,
1026 (2005).
32. On Rwanda, see Drumbl, supra note 24, at 1246-51.
33. MICHAEL MANN, THE DARK SIDE OF DEMOCRACY 27-29 (2006).
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III. THE PRINCIPAL IN ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW THEORY
A. Causation and the Concept of the Principal
English criminal law provides a seemingly straightforward defi-
nition of the principal party to a crime-it is the person who most
directly and immediately fulfills the definitional elements of the of-
fense.34 There can be more than one principal party to an offense, for
instance where P1 and P2 both separately meet all elements of the
relevant offense, or where P1 and P2 are joint principals such that
both have the requisite mens rea and their actions, in combination,
fulfill the actus reus required for the offense.35 In this situation, P1
will personally not commit at least some part of the actus reus for the
offense.36
The distinction between the principal and other parties to a
crime is based on the notion of immediacy of the causal connection
between the conduct of the offender and its consequences. 3 7 Gener-
ally speaking, the principal P's volitional actions are considered the
cause of an act or omission if they constitute the ultimate human con-
duct before the result.38 Thus, the voluntary intervention by a third
party D is regarded as having broken the chain of causation, result-
ing in D being held liable as the principal and P only being considered
as an accessory to the offense, provided he meets the relevant actus
reus and mens rea requirements.39 This view of what constitutes cau-
sation is grounded in Hart and Honord's influential work
distinguishing between occurrences in the realm of nature and those
in the field of human relationships, based on the autonomy and
agency of human actions. Thus, while it may be logical to talk about
events in the natural world as having been "caused" by other events
or by a human agent, the conduct of a voluntary human actor cannot
be said to be "caused" by any other human being-the latter can at
best give "reasons for action" for the former. 40 This is because every
human being, in Kadish's inimitable style, is ultimately a "wild card"
who is, in the final analysis, free to make any decision he likes or to
change his mind.41
The only exception that Hart and Honord recognize to this view
of human actions is when the conduct of the primary actor P is invol-
34. KJM SMITH, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 27-28
(1991).
35. SIMESTER ET AL., supra note 5, at 207.
36. SMITH, supra note 34, at 28.
37. Id., at 80.
38. ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 105.
39. Id., at 106-111 (discussing in detail the exceptions to this principle).
40. HLA HART & AM HONOR, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 48-54 (1959). For a critical
look at this thesis, see J.H. Mansfield, Causation in the Law-A Comment, 17 VAND.
L. REV. 487, 510-14 (1963).
41. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpreta-
tion of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 360 (1985).
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untary or not wholly voluntary. They cite instances of when an
accused D intends P to perform a particular action and P's action is
not fully voluntary in that it is induced by coercion, deceit or the exer-
cise of authority. In these situations, D may still be considered the
principal party.42 The exact scope of "not fully voluntary actions" in
their thesis is unclear. They suggest that these are not limited to
cases where P would be exempt from criminal liability.4 3 Thus, the
scope of non-voluntary actions appears broader than situations where
P would either be excused or justified in his conduct. At another
place, they also list a number of non-exhaustive factors that may take
away from the voluntariness of P's conduct, including lack of muscu-
lar control or consciousness, duress, and predicaments created by D
for P where P cannot be said to have a "fair choice." 44 They do not
however elaborate further on these circumstances or on the limits of
their operation. As we shall later explore, resolving this ambiguity is
crucial to constructing an appropriate concept of principalship.
The traditional formulation of the accessory's liability in English
law conceives of it as derivative in nature, that is, it arises from and
is dependent upon D's contribution to or participation in the offense
committed by the primary party P.45 There are different views, how-
ever, on what must be the nature of this participation. For instance,
does D's liability result from his participation in the crime perpe-
trated by P, or does it flow from his participation in the wrongful act
carried out by P?46 If the latter is the case, D could possibly incur
criminal responsibility even when P is excused (for example on
grounds of duress), but not when P is justified in committing the
act.4 7 Second, must the nature of D's participation be "causal" in
some way, that is, should it have made a difference to the outcome of
the ultimate offense by P?48 Alternatively, is it sufficient that D in-
tentionally contributed to P's conduct while possessing the mens rea
required for the offense committed by P and intending that P perform
42. HART & HONORi, supra note 40, at 323-24.
43. Id., at 340.
44. Id., at 70.
45. Kadish, supra note 41, at 337. It should be noted that this rationale has come
increasingly under attack and prominent commentators consider other theories that
attach more importance to D's independent conduct to have gained precedence. See
ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 426-27. Other prominent common law countries such as
the United States also adhere to the derivative approach. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UN-
DERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 466 (2009).
46. On the implications of this distinction, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 641-45 (2000). Several commentators have advocated basing the re-
sponsibility of the accessory on the wrongful act of the principal, rather than on the
offense: see Kadish, supra note 41, at 379-82; Peter Alldridge, The Doctrine of Inno-
cent Agency, 2 CRIM. L. FORUM 45, 46-47 (1990).
47. FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 6421-43.
48. SMITH, supra note 34, at 7, 246.
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the actions that ultimately resulted in P's liability?4 9 As we shall see
in the following sections, these questions have a bearing on our no-
tion of principalship.
B. The Problem of the Accessory's Greater Liability
Since on the traditional account, the accessory's liability is deriv-
ative in nature, the orthodox view was that the accessory D's liability
cannot exceed that of the principal P. In the frequently cited case of R
v. Richards,50 the defendant hired two men with the intention that
they grievously hurt her husband, but the men instead inflicted only
minor injuries. The issue was whether the defendant can be charged
as an accessory for the more serious offense of unlawful and mali-
cious wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm, when the
principals were only convicted of unlawfully and maliciously wound-
ing another person. The court answered the question in the negative,
holding that since only one offense had been committed, and that this
offense was one of unlawful wounding, it was not possible to hold any
accessory liable for an offense greater than the one that had actually
been committed. This position was overturned by the decision of the
House of Lords in Howe,51 where the court affirmed that a secondary
party can be convicted of murder, despite the principal having been
convicted only of manslaughter. The court's reasoning for this pro-
position, however, was quite cursory, and it did not address the
theoretical basis for taking this position. 52 Indeed, the decision in
Howe has been interpreted by some commentators to constitute a
partial abandonment of the derivative theory, since D's liability can
hardly be said to derive from the more serious offense of murder
which was never committed. It is instead based on his own personal
culpability stemming from what he intended or contemplated.53
49. Kadish, supra note 41, at 346-50. English law seems to have followed Kadish
in not, requiring that the accessory's contribution have any causal potency: see
Glanville Williams, Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code-I, 1990 CRIM. L. REV. 4,
6; C.M.V CLARKSON ET AL, CLARKSON AND KEATING'S CRIMINAL LAW: TEXT AND MATERI-
ALS 548-49 (2007). Dennis remarks that the accessory's causal connection with the
offense may be immaterial-I.H. Dennis, The Mental Element for Accessories, in
CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF J.C. SMITH 40, 41 (Peter Smith ed., 1987). The
position is somewhat similar in the United States: LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 711-12.
There have however been calls for taking the causation element in accomplice liability
more seriously: Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a
Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 427 (2008).
50. [1974] Q.B. 776. The case has been the subject of much debate. See FLETCHER,
supra note 46, at 672-73; CLARKSON & KEATING, supra note 49, at 578-79.
51. R v. Howe, [1987] 1 A.C. 417.
52. SMITH, supra note 34, at 130; CLARKSON & KEATING, supra note 49, at 578-79.
53. ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 427; Simester and Sullivan dispute this inter-
pretation by arguing that murder and manslaughter should not be considered as
independent offenses since the core of the wrong is identical in both cases: SIMESTER
ET AL., supra note 5, at 249-50.
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The problem of accessorial liability that potentially exceeds that
of the principal may perhaps be dismissed as a minor anomaly in the
theory of derivative liability. Most situations that we encounter in
our lives, and those that come before courts, would involve principals
that our intuitions would consider more culpable than their accesso-
rial counterparts. However, examples abound of situations where
convicting the "secondary party" D of a lesser offense would seem to
understate the degree of his culpability versus the "primary party"
P.54 English criminal law's solution to the conundrum of the secon-
dary party's greater liability has been twofold:55 the first relies on a
broader conceptualization of the derivative nature of accessorial lia-
bility, whereas the other depends on an expansion of the concept of
principalship.
C. A Broader Conception of Derivative Liability
The broader conception of accessorial liability rests the liability
of the accessory D, not on the crime committed by the principal P, but
on the objectively harmful wrong perpetrated by P.56 It has been rec-
ommended as a sound basis for derivative accessorial liability by
academics drawing upon German criminal law theory,57 and has also
been proposed by the Law Commission's Report, "Participating in
Crime."58 The argument is that while wrongfulness is a feature of the
act objectively considered, culpability is always personal in nature.59
P's culpability cannot therefore be imputed to D and instead must be
judged in terms of D's own mental state with respect to the objec-
tively wrongful act.60
At first glance, the theory appears especially promising for at-
tributing liability for international crimes.61 Imputation of liability
for international crimes is a very different enterprise from that for
domestic crimes. Unlike a reduction of liability from murder to man-
slaughter that P may incur due to some excuse, in a prosecution for
54. Commentators frequently take inspiration from Othello in signaling how even
though Othello the principal is clearly guilty in killing Desdemona, the greater culpa-
bility lies with the mastermind lago.
55. I will not discuss the introduction of the offenses of "encouraging or assisting
crime" here, which introduce a wholly new category of parties to a crime by holding
persons responsible for the inchoate offenses of encouragement or assistance under
Sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007.
56. SMITH, supra note 34, at 130.
57. Kadish, supra note 41, at 390; FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 641-44.
58. LAw COMMISSION, PARTICIPATING IN CRIME 1[ 4.14, 4.15 (Law Com No 305 Cm
7084, 2007).
59. Fletcher defines culpability as a form of accountability, which is distinct from
it in that it is limited to wrongful acts (and not those that are justified) and that it is
linked to the degree of wrongdoing: FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 459.
60. Id., at 642.
61. Ashworth's objection to the Howe holding on the ground that the greater
crime for which the accessory is convicted never took place would be inapplicable in
this context. See ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 427.
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an international crime such as genocide, P may be culpable for an
entirely different crime such as murder. P's "objectively wrongful act"
appears a much stronger basis for assessing D's liability. As long as D
possesses the requisite mental state for the crime of genocide while
intending P to commit the single crime of murder, D's liability would
still be derivative of P's act. This would of course only be a partial
explanation of D's liability, as one murder by itself does not consti-
tute an international crime. D's liability would ultimately be
derivative of thousands of wrongful acts carried out by principals
such as P, with D possessing the mens rea for genocide, and regard-
less of whether P and the other physical perpetrators conceived of
their actions as amounting to genocide.
Whichever doctrine of accomplice liability one chooses to follow,
the problem still persists that holding D responsible only as an acces-
sory misstates his actual role and participation in the offense. While
language can possibly bear the strain of an accessory being held lia-
ble for murder while the principal is convicted only of manslaughter,
it is more difficult to assign the label of an "accessory" to a gg-
nocidaire where the principal is guilty only of murder. It also goes
against the notion of the principal as the "dominant party" in the
chain of events leading up to the wrongful act. 6 2 Is it possible then to
conceive of D as the principal while remaining true to English law's
theory of complicity and participation in crime? This is what we will
next examine.
D. Innocent and Semi-Innocent Agency
The principal as a party to the crime is not widely discussed in
English criminal law, which lavishes most of its attention on the ac-
cessory and the elements of accessorial liability. This is in contrast to
legal systems such as Germany, where the principal is the primary
focus of discussion and the accessory is defined negatively by first
identifying the potential scope of principal conduct.63
This problem becomes apparent when one considers situations in
which English criminal law departs from its basic premise that P's
voluntary conduct is the cause of an offense if it is the final human
conduct before the result, and expands the scope of principals to in-
clude parties whose conduct in relation to an offense is interrupted by
62. On the principal as the actor who occupies center stage in a criminal scheme,
see FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 656.
63. SMITH, supra note 34, at 80-81. Indeed, the subject of parties to a crime as a
whole, including complicity, has commanded even less attention in common law coun-
tries with otherwise rich and influential academic scholarship in the criminal law,
such as the United States: see Dressler, supra note 49, at 429; Robert Weisberg, Reap-
praising Complicity, 4 Bur. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 222 (2000).
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the act of an intervening third party.64 The most striking instance of
this is found in the doctrine of "innocent agency" where the "innocent
agent" is a person whose actions are not deemed free, informed and
voluntary due to some personal factors such as insanity, ignorance, or
minority, and for this reason can be regarded as having been "caused"
by the words or conduct of another person (for instance through coer-
cion or deception).65
The typical case in international criminal law merits a slightly
different approach; the range of actions that would be considered ex-
cused or justified in domestic crimes, and therefore labeled
"involuntary" is broader than similar conduct in international crimes.
International criminal law permits the defenses of duress and supe-
rior orders to the physical perpetrator of the crime in very limited
circumstances.66 Moreover, there is something intuitively false in
speaking of the actions of a person who commits a murder, even if his
conduct stems from its permissibility in a climate of mass atrocity, as
"innocent."
The better approach is to consider his responsibility under the
doctrine of "semi-innocent" agency. As described by the Law Commis-
sion, the notion of semi-innocent agency applies when the perpetrator
P satisfies the fault element of a less serious offense, but is innocent
because he lacks the fault element for the more serious offense in-
tended by the secondary party D, and which shares the same actus
reus.67 P's actions are considered less than fully voluntary, but not to
such an extent so as to fully absolve him of any criminal responsibil-
ity.6 8 They can be characterized as having been "caused" to the extent
that he does not possess complete knowledge with respect to the na-
ture or circumstances of his conduct.69 This certainly seems a logical
extension of the doctrine of innocent agency. As Williams puts it, if D
can act through a completely innocent agent P1, there is no reason
why he cannot do so through a semi-innocent agent P2. It would be
unreasonable for the partial guilt of P2 to operate as a defense
64. ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 106-11. Ashworth mentions three such situa-
tions-non-voluntary conduct of third parties; conduct of doctors; and conduct of the
victim.
65. Glanville Williams, Innocent Agency and Causation, 3 CRIM. L. FORUM 289,
294 (1992). In the United States, the Model Penal Code as well as several state stat-
utes recognize the doctrine of innocent agency: see John F. Decker, The Mental State
Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REv. 237,
255-56 (2008). On the doctrine generally, see DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 468-69.
66. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, at arts. 31, 33.
67. LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at [[ [4.14], [4.15]; SMITH, supra
note 34, at 130.
68. Kadish, supra note 41, at 388 (citing HART & HONORE, supra note 40, at 296-
304).
69. SMITH, supra note 34, at 130,
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against D. 70 P2 would be treated as an innocent agent in respect of
"part of the responsibility" of D. 7 1
This doctrine would perhaps capture the relationship and conse-
quent liability between a senior leader or a person in a position of
authority who intends to commit genocide and the individual physi-
cal perpetrator of an offense such as murder quite well. Two issues
that would need to be fleshed out in greater detail would be to what
extent the actus reus of the two offenses can be considered "shared"
given that the actus reus of murder (by P2) will usually form a tiny
part of the actus reus of genocide (by D), and whether there are con-
ceptual problems with aggregating the actus reus of several offenses
in order to form that of the larger offense perpetrated by D. The sec-
ond is the extent to which P2 can strictly be called an "agent" of D in
a situation of mass conflict, where P2 and D may not form part of a
vertical chain of command and where P2 may in fact be unaware of
D's existence and machinations.
E. Joint Criminal Enterprise
1. Elements and Structure of Joint Enterprise Liability
One way to analyze the relative poverty of doctrines of principal
responsibility in English law is to consider that since principals and
accessories are punished equally, the real debate has centered round
the requirements for secondary responsibility. Indeed, one of the
most prominent doctrines of perpetration responsibility for interna-
tional crimes-Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)-bears a marked
similarity to the mode of joint enterprise liability, which is a form of
accessorial liability in English law. Joint enterprise liability can take
one of two forms. The first or basic form is when D and P agree or act
in concert to commit crime X (say burglary). D will be party to the
joint venture if he intended that the burglary be committed or if he
foresaw that P or any other party to the agreement might commit the
burglary.72 The second and more controversial form, which Smith la-
bels "parasitic accessory liability,"73 arises when in the course of
committing crime X, P goes on to commit a further crime Y (say mur-
der). Here, D will be liable on the basis of joint enterprise liability
if:7 4 1) D and P embark on a joint venture for the commission of crime
70. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAw 374 (1983).
71. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 391 (1961).
72. J.C. Smith, Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform 113 L. Q.
REV. 453, 454 (1997); Robert Sullivan, First Degree Murder and Complicity-Condi-
tions for Parity of Culpability between Principal and Accomplice, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
271, 274 (2007).
73. Smith, supra note 72, at 454-55.
74. Id., at 455; Sullivan, supra note 72, at 275; ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 420;
DAVID ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 209 (10th
ed. 2009).
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X; 2) D had foreseen that in the course of committing crime X, there
was a real risk that P might commit a further crime; and 3) Crime Y
committed by P occurred as an incident of the joint enterprise and did
not fundamentally differ from the crime anticipated by D.
The issue of the accessory's foresight is central to the determina-
tion of responsibility arising out of participation in a joint criminal
venture. The very scope of the joint enterprise depends on "what was
contemplated by parties sharing that purpose."75 Thus, D will not be
liable for a crime Y committed by P in the course of committing crime
X if the act done by P was "fundamentally different" from what D
contemplated. 76 The question of what makes P's act fundamentally
different from that contemplated by D has caused some confusion,
that is, whether it relates to the difference in weapons77 used by P,
his actions or intentions, or the consequences of his acts.78 For in-
stance in Rahman, D, along with a group of people armed with a
variety of blunt instruments, engaged in a gang fight during the
course of which the victim was stabbed, resulting in his death. D ar-
gued that he did not know that any of the members possessed a knife
or that they would act with the intent to kill. The House of Lords held
that P's intent to kill was not fundamentally different from the real
risk of death or grievous bodily harm being caused intentionally that
had been foreseen by D.7 9 The test of fundamental difference applied
to the nature of P's acts or his actual conduct rather than to his
intent.80
Simester and Sullivan interpret the concept of fundamental dif-
ference to be most closely related to the degree of dangerousness, that
is, if the weapon used by P was different from, but equally dangerous
as, the weapon which D contemplated he may use, D will still be lia-
ble under joint enterprise liability.81 The degree of dangerousness is,
however, not evaluated solely according to the weapon used, but also
by taking into account the context and other evidence. 82 This inter-
pretation of fundamental difference as based on dangerousness
75. R v. Powell, [1999] 1 A.C. 1, 11 (citing with approval McAuliffe v. R, (1995)
130 A.L.R. 26, 30 and Hui Chi-ming v. R, [1992] 1 A.C. 34. See CLARKSON & KEATING,
supra note 49, at 557.
76. OMEROD, supra note 74, at 210.
77. English, [1997] 4 ALL E.R. 545, 564; SIMESTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 237.
78. OMEROD, supra note 74, at 213.
79. R v. Rahman, [20081 UKHL 45; [20091 1 A.C. 129. See ASHWORTH, supra note
10, at 423, 425.
80. ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 425; SIMESTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 238. As has
been recently emphasized, this holding does not imply that D need not foresee that P
might act with intent. P must foresee not only that D may commit the actus reus of
crime Y, but that he may do so with the requisite mens rea for crime Y: R. v. A, [2010]
EWCA Crim 1622; [2011] Q.B. 841 (Can.); David Ormerod, Case Comment: R. v. A,
[2011] CRIm L. REV. 61, 63-4.
81. SIMESTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 238-39. They also cite the decision of the
Court of Appeal in Uddin, [19991 Q.B. 431, 441 as supporting this reasoning.
82. Id., at 239.
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seems too narrow as it concerns primarily cases of differences in
weapons and does not yield a broader principle that would apply to
other deviations. A more useful approach is to look at whether P ac-
ted so as to bring about the consequence which D contemplated.
Whether P chooses to use a knife or a gun, the victim is equally dead
in either case. The method by which he accomplished this result
should be irrelevant. 3 Conversely, even if D knew that P had a knife,
if he contemplated only that P would use it to frighten the victim, he
should not be held responsible if P stabbed the victim instead, caus-
ing his death.84 The test of foresight or contemplation thus seems
mostly closely related to the expected outcome of P's conduct.85
2. Justification for Joint Enterprise Responsibility
At first glance, liability arising out of participation in a joint
criminal venture, particularly D's liability for the collateral offense
committed by P, appears to unduly extend the scope of D's liability
for offenses to which he has made no direct contribution. Several ar-
guments, both normative and pragmatic, have been adduced to
support this extension. One set of arguments focuses on the conduct
of the secondary party and is grounded in his voluntary association
with a criminal venture. The element of collusion not only constitutes
a manifestation of D's criminal proclivities8 6 but also makes his con-
duct an independent wrong.87 D's participation in the unlawful
enterprise represents his affiliation with a segment of society that
has set itself against the rule of law.88 Even if D does not make any
direct contribution to the collateral offense, he is indirectly causally
connected to it as he helps create or contribute to the situation in
which it occurs.89 In more close-knit ventures, D may also be in a
position of authority to exercise supervision over the other members
and restrain their conduct. 90 This reasoning appears to base D's con-
viction on his "criminal proclivities," which is not particularly
persuasive. Apart from being circular, the argument does not have
anything to say about how the same logic should not then apply to D's
liability for aiding and abetting. D's purported affiliation with anti-
rule of law sentiments as a basis for his extended liability is also un-
83. J.C. Smith, Case and Comment: R. v. Powell and Daniels, [1998] CRIM. L. REV.
48, 50; ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 425; OMEROD, supra note 74, at 214; CLARKSON &
KEATING, supra note 49, at 563.
84. Smith, supra note 83, at 51.
85. See ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 425.
86. SMITH, supra note 34, at 6.
87. SIMESTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 244, n.260; Simester, supra note 10, at 600-
01.
88. SIMESTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 244; Simester, supra note 10, at 600.
89. See Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 633
(1984).
90. See SMITH, supra note 34, at 233.
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convincing. Arguably, anyone who commits or facilitates the
commission of an offense in any manner exhibits the same
characteristics.
A second set of justifications for joint enterprise liability stems
from a risk/endangerment rationale similar to that used for inchoate
offenses. Through his association with a criminal enterprise, D in-
creases the likelihood that the collateral offense will occur. 9'
Criminal enterprises also represent a greater threat to public safety
than individuals acting alone, as the members of the enterprise tend
to mutually reinforce individual criminal tendencies, discouraging
withdrawal and often resulting in an escalation of crime.92 Moreover,
liability based on participation in the joint enterprise deters people
from associating with criminal ventures and thus makes the offenses
less likely to occur.93 These are empirical claims that have some
merit, but perhaps need to be supported by fairly comprehensive
studies in other areas of the social sciences. The argument on deter-
rence especially does not seem very plausible. At least in cases of
joint enterprise that involve spontaneous outbreaks of violence such
as street fights, it is unlikely that the potential for punishment would
feature very strongly in the decision making calculus of a party to the
enterprise. Neither is it entirely clear that even if one or more per-
sons are deterred from participating in the joint venture, this would
necessarily mean that an offense is less likely to be committed. Of-
fenses that are committed pursuant to joint ventures which involve a
relatively large number of persons, or in which individual actors are
more or less dispensable, would be just as likely to occur.
IV. THE PRINCIPAL IN GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW THEORY
A. Forms of Participation in German Criminal Law
German criminal law presents a complicated and minutely theo-
rized account of the principal party to a crime, especially as compared
to English criminal law. This is partly on account of the fact that a
party to a crime can only be classified as an accessory once it has
been established that he cannot be considered a principal.94 In con-
trast with prominent common law systems such as England and the
United States, the label of a perpetrator also has important sentenc-
ing consequences, since Section 27 of the German Criminal Code
91. Id., at 6.
92. Simester, supra note 10, at 600-01; SIMESTER ET AL, supra note 5, at 244; ASH-
WORTH, supra note 10, at 403.
93. SMITH, supra note 34, at 233; see also ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 404.
94. SMITH, supra note 34, at 80-81.
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(StGB)95 provides for a mandatory mitigation of sentence for aiders
(though not for instigators).
The StGB regulates the following categories of participation in a
crime:
Section 25
Principals
(1) Any person who commits the offense himself or
through another shall be liable as a principal.
(2) If more than one person commit the offense jointly,
each shall be liable as a principal (joint principals).
Section 26
Instigation
Any person who intentionally induces another to inten-
tionally commit an unlawful act (abettor) shall be liable
to be sentenced as if he were a principal.
Section 27
Aiding
(1) Any person who intentionally assists another in the
intentional commission of an unlawful act shall be con-
victed and sentenced as an aider.
(2) The sentence for the aider shall be based on the pen-
alty for a principal. It shall be mitigated pursuant to
section 49 (1).
Thus, a principal or perpetrator is one who commits the offense
himself (unmittelbare Tater or direct perpetrator); or through another
person (mittelbare Tater or indirect perpetrator); or jointly with an-
other principal (Mittater or co-perpetrator). In addition,
commentators recognize the category of Nebentaterschaft, or indepen-
dent multiple principals, acting alongside each other towards the
commission of an offense.96 An accessory is one who intentionally in-
duces another person to intentionally commit an unlawful act
(Anstifter, or instigator); or who intentionally renders aid to another
in the latter's intentional commission of an unlawful act (Gehilfe, or
aider).97
95. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I 3322. I have
relied on the English translation by Michael Bohlander authorized by the Federal
Ministry of Justice, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-stgb/in-
dex.html. The only variation I have introduced is in the translation of the term
Anstiftung as "Instigation" rather than the original "Abetting" as I believe it is a more
appropriate reflection of the term in English law. I am grateful to Claus Kress and
Rebecca Williams for helping me arrive at an accurate translation.
96. JOHANNES WESSELs & WERNER BEULKE, STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL: DIE
STRAFTAT UND IHR AUFBAU (SCHWERPUNKTE) 179 (2008); MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCI.
PLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAw 153 (2009).
97. SCHWERPUNKTE, supra note 96, at 179; BOHLANDER, supra note 96, at 153.
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The StGB is silent on the criterion for the dividing line between
principals and accessories. While the Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof or BGH) favors a subjective approach towards
this demarcation,98 the criterion of control is most influential among
criminal law commentators:99
B. Act Domination or Control Theory (Tatherrschaftslehre)
The theory most widely endorsed in current scientific literature
is the theory of "act domination" or control (Tatherrschaftslehre). On
this account, the decisive criterion for establishing the boundary be-
tween principals and accessories is control over the act: the
perpetrator dominates or controls the commission of the act, and the
accessory participates in its occurrence without domination. To have
control over the act means to hold in one's hands the elements consti-
tuting the offense (with the requisite intent).100 This control can take
different forms: direct domination over the act in the case of direct
perpetration (Handlungsherrschaft); control over the will of the di-
rect perpetrator or domination arising out of the superior knowledge
of the indirect perpetrator in the case of indirect perpetration (Willen-
sherrschaft); functional domination of the participating joint actor in
the case of co-perpetration (funktionalle Tatherrschaft).1ox The perpe-
trator is the person who, as the key figure (Zentralgestalt) in the
events, exercises this control through his ability to strategically mas-
termind the commission of the act or through his joint hegemony over
the act.102
The control theory was first systematized by Claus Roxin, and is
now endorsed by the majority of commentators, though in varying
forms. Further, the current jurisprudence of the BGH comes quite
close to it in its use of objective criteria for the identification of the
will of the perpetrator. 03 The following section discusses the catego-
98. The subjective theories differentiate between parties to a crime based on the
will and inner attitude of the participant. While the later jurisprudence of the BGH
continues to adhere to a subjectively oriented demarcation criterion, it is overlaid by
considerable objective elements in its assessment of this subjective criterion: see
Ulrich Sieber & Marc Engelhart, Strafbare Mitwirkung von Ftihrungspersonen, in
Straftatergruppen und Netzwerken in Deutschland 16-17 (2009) (unpublished report,
Max-Planck-Institut far auslandisches und internationales Strafrecht) (on file with
author) [hereinafter MPICC report]; SCHWERPUNKTE, supra note 96, at 182-83.
99. Objective theories, according to which the perpetrator is the person who real-
izes the elements of an offense, either in full or in part, himself and all other
contributors to the offense are accessories, are seldom advanced today:
STRAFGESETZBUCH LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR (GROAKOMMENTAR): BAND I 1848 (Heinrich
Wilhelm Laufhitte et al. eds., 2006).
100. ScHWERPuNKTE, supra note 96, at 181; MPICC report, supra note 98, at 17.
101. SCHWERPUNKTE, supra note 96, at 181.
102. Id., at 181-82; MPICC report, supra note 98, at 17.
103. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at 1848, 1856-57. See e.g.,
Katzenknigfall (Cat King Case), BHGST 35, 347.
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ries of indirect perpetration and co-perpetration based on the control
theory.
C. Indirect Perpetration and Co-Perpetration
1. Indirect Perpetration (Die mittelbare Taterschaft)
Section 25 states that a person who commits a crime through an-
other is an indirect perpetrator. The word "through" signifies that the
indirect perpetrator (Hintermann) controls the direct perpetrator
(Vordermann) of the act in such a manner that he uses him as an
instrument. Due to this "tool" function, the Vordermann normally
possesses some deficit (for instance, he lacks the requisite intent for
the offense), which the Hintermann exploits in order to dominate
him. 104 While the Vordermann still possesses Handlungsherrschaft
(act hegemony), this is overlaid by the Willensherrschaft or domina-
tion over the will of the Vordermann by the Hintermann.105
Roxin formulates three main categories of indirect perpetration:
coercion; utilization of a mistake on the part of the Vordermann or on
the basis of the Hintermann's superior knowledge; and hegemony
through control over an organizational apparatus (Organisation-
sherrschaft), which I will discuss below. 106
2. Co-perpetration (Mittdterschaft)
Co-perpetration is the joint commission of a criminal act 0 7
through the knowing and willing co-operative conduct of the individ-
ual participants.108 It is based on the functional act domination of
each co-perpetrator, which arises from the principle of division of la-
bor and functional role allocation. 109 This ensures that the success of
the criminal act is possible only through the co-operation of all co-
perpetrators. 110 Co-perpetration has an objective requirement of col-
lective act execution for the realization of the elements of the offense,
and a subjective requirement of a common act plan.1 11
a. Collective act execution
The co-perpetrators must work together jointly, based on a divi-
sion of labor towards the result of the elements of the offense. The act
contribution of each co-perpetrator must therefore be of sufficient
104. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 19; SCHWERPUNKTE, supra note 96, at 190.
105. CLAUS ROXIN, TATERSCHAFT uND TATHERRSCHAFT 143 (2006) [hereinafter
RoxuN, TT].
106. Id., at 242.
107. STGB § 25.
108. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 29; SCHWERPUNKTE, supra note 96, at 186.
109. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at 1931.
110. Id., at 1931-32.
111. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 29.
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weight and importance such that it grounds the necessary co-domina-
tion over the act.112
There is a good deal of controversy over whether act contribu-
tions in the preparation stage suffice for co-perpetration. According to
the BGH, even a small co-operation in the preparation stage may
lead to liability as a co-perpetrator if it is carried out with the will of a
perpetrator,113 but commentators are divided on this requirement.
One strand of opinion insists that the co-perpetrator must take part
in some manner in the execution of the crime.114 Others argue that
unlike an accessory, an individual such as a gang leader who does not
take part in the execution does not participate in the act of another;
instead the result follows from a willing collective participation in ajoint act.115
There is, however, merit in the argument that since perpetration
is tied to the realization of the elements of the offense, co-perpetra-
tion must consist of joint domination of these elements.116 Thus, only
co-operation in the execution stage would justify responsibility as a
co-perpetrator.
b. Common act plan
Co-perpetration requires that the contributors to the criminal act
reach an agreement to commit the act as equal partners." 7 There
must be mutual consent over the joint realization of the act at the
time, or even before the beginning, of the act; this agreement may not
take place explicitly, but can also take place by implication." 8 Co-
perpetration is also possible if the individual participants do not
know each other, as long as each person is conscious that there are
other participants who are likewise working towards a common goal,
and these other participants have the same knowledge."19
From the necessity for a common act plan it follows that the act
of one of the contributors that goes beyond the plan, the so-called "ex-
cess," cannot be attributed to the others.120 This is because the other
112. Id., at 30.
113. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at 1942 and cases cited therein.
114. RoxIN, TT, supra note 105, at 298-300.
115. SCHWERPUNKTE, supra note 96, at 190.
116. See LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at 1943.
117. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 31; LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at
1938.
118. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 31; LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at
1938.
119. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 31; LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at
1939.
120. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 32; LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99, at
1940.
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contributors do not have hegemony over the act or the requisite in-
tention regarding the deviation.121
3. Organisationsherrschaft
a. Overview
The category of Organisationsherrschaft developed by Roxin re-
fers to cases where the Hintermann has an organized power
apparatus at his disposal through which he can accomplish the of-
fenses he aims at, without having to leave their realization
contingent on an independent decision by the Vordermann.
The special position of the Hintermann results from the specific
mode of action within the framework of the organizational apparatus.
Such an organization develops a life which is independent of the
changing existence of its members and of the decisions of the individ-
ual act executors; it functions, as it were, automatically. To use a
figure of speech, the Hintermann sits at the operational center of the
organizational structure and if he presses a button to order a killing,
he can expect it to be fulfilled without him even knowing who exe-
cutes the action.122 This expectation of fulfillment does not arise from
any deception or duress on the part of the Hintermann. Instead, it is
based on the fungibility of the executing organs, such that if one or-
gan refuses to participate, another immediately steps into its place
and the execution of the total plan continues unhindered. Each exe-
cuting organ is therefore an anonymous and arbitrarily exchangeable
figure, much like a simple cog in the machine-like organization, that
places the Hintermann in the central position of the occurrence and
lends him domination over the act.123
It is irrelevant for Organisationsherrschaft whether the
Hintermann acts on his own initiative or on the instructions of more
highly placed superiors. All that is required is that he can direct or
steer the part of the organization which is subordinate to him, with-
out having to rely on the resolution of his subordinates for the
commission of the offense.124
Other versions of Organisationsherrschaft that differ from
Roxin's account have been suggested. For instance, for Schroeder, in-
121. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 32. There are some limited exceptions to this
rule: see MPICC report, supra note 98, at 32; LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 99,
at 1940; SCHWERPUNKTE, supra note 96, at 189.
122. Claus Roxin, Straftaten im Rahmen organisatorischer Machtapparate,
GOLTDAMMER's ARCHIV FOR STRAFRECHT 193, 200 (1963); RoXIN, TT, supra note 105,
at 245.
123. Roxin, supra note 122, at 200-01; RoxiN, TT, supra note 105, at 245.
124. Roxin, supra note 122, at 203; RoxIN, TT, supra note 105, at 248. This aspect
of Organisationsherrschaft has been criticized by Ambos: Kai Ambos, The Fujimori
Judgment: A President's Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity as Indirect Per-
petrator by Virtue of an Organized Power Apparatus, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUsT. 137, 152-
53 (2011).
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stead of the fungibility of the act intermediaries, the responsibility of
the Hintermann is based on his use of a Vordermann who is already
determined to carry out the criminal act. In this case too, the
Hintermann may rely on the almost automatic regular implementa-
tion of his criminal goal due to the intermediary's already complete,
though conditional, readiness to commit the offense. 125 The culpabil-
ity of the Hintermann arises from the fact that he consciously
provides the igniting spark for the explosive material and avails him-
self of a pliable tool for a criminal result in his own interest.126
Schroeder and Roxin's versions both find their way into the
BGH's decision in the German border guards case,127 which combines
Roxin's account of Organisationsherrschaft with Schroeder's criterion
of the intermediary's (absolute) readiness to realize the criminal
act,128 though with some departures from the original
formulations. 129
b. Elements of Organisationsherrschaft
There are three main elements in Roxin's theory of Organisation-
sherrschaft: (1) the existence of a vertical hierarchically structured
power apparatus; (2) the direct executor's fungibility within the appa-
ratus; and (3) the apparatus's detachedness from the law.' 30
125. Thomas Rotsch, Tatherrschaft kraft Organisationsherrschaft?, 112 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 518, 524 (2001).
126. F.C. SCHROEDER, DER TATER HINTER DEM TATER: EIN BEITRAG ZUR LEHRE VON
DER MITTELBAREN TATERSCHAFr S. 158 (1965). Schroeder's position has been effec-
tively criticized in literature: see Rotsch, supra note 125, at 525; Harro Otto,
Thterschaft kraft organisatorischen Machtapparates, 2001 JURA 753, 757-58; Claus
Roxin, Anmerkung, 1995 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 49, 51; Kai Ambos, Ththerrschaft durch
Willensherrschaft kraft organisatorischer Machtapparate, GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHry FOR
STRAFRECHT 226, 230 (1998). Recently however, Roxin himself has suggested that the
direct perpetrator's readiness to commit the act could have a symbolic value and be
considered a characteristic, rather than an independent criterion, of Organisation-
sherrschaft: Claus Roxin, Bemerkungen zum Fujimori-Urteil des Obersten
Gerichtshofs in Peru, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 565,
567 (2009).
127. BGHST 40, 218-40.
128. See Roxin, Organisationsherrschaft und Tatentschlossenheit, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 293, 293-94 (2006).
129. For instance, on the BGH's extension of Organisationsherrschaft to economic
entities, see MPICC Report, supra note 98, at 23-24; Thomas Weigend, Perpetration
through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German Legal Concept, 9 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 91, 99 (2011).
130. Henning Radtke, Mittelbare Taterschaft kraft Organisationsherrschaft im na-
tionalen und internationalen Strafrecht, GOLTDAMMER's ARCHIV FOR STRAFRECHT 350,
354 (2006). In his article on the Fujimori judgment rendered by the Peruvian Su-
preme Court, Ambos refers to two additional criteria cited by the court: a responsible
command of the indirect perpetrator and the direct perpetrator's readiness to commit
the criminal act: Ambos, supra note 124, at 149-50.
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4. Taut Hierarchical Organizational Structure
Roxin's elucidation of Organisationsherrschaft requires an orga-
nizational structure which functions such that the instructions of the
Hintermann lead to an automatic implementation of the elements of
the offense. Roxin also talks of an organization that is independent of
its individual members who act as functional parts of a larger ma-
chine like structure; this is the basis on which he excludes a group of
asocial elements who simply unite to commit common criminal of-
fenses.13 This presupposes a fairly tightly organized hierarchical
structure. 132
Roxin ties this structure to the existence of a large number of
fungible act intermediaries. It is a little difficult, however, to recon-
cile these two elements: the larger the number of act intermediaries,
the more difficult it would be to control the system so that the
Hintermann's instructions are implemented smoothly.133 This is even
more so if these intermediaries are arbitrarily replaceable. Roxin
could be taken as referring to a functionally differentiated large en-
terprise, where the actors often do not know of each other's exact
roles and perform their tasks more or less independently. It is, how-
ever, more difficult to ensure a "regular operational sequence" within
such a structure 34 and the arbitrary replaceability of the in-
termediaries becomes far more limited.
Moreover, as far as international crimes are concerned, Roxin's
organizational structure, though conceded by him to be an "ideal
type,"13 5 does not reflect the reality of the majority of situations of
mass conflict.' 36 Crimes committed by the direct perpetrators in
these situations are often spontaneous, or crimes of opportunity. The
direct executor can hardly be said to be part of any power structure,
and even less a tightly organized and controlled one, especially given
that the crimes are spatially and temporally widespread.
131. Roxin, supra note 122, at 206; RoXIN, TT, supra note 105, at 251.
132. Ambos, supra note 126, at 240-41.
133. Rotsch, supra note 125, at 557.
134. Rolf D. Herzberg, Mittelbare Titerschaft und Anstiftung in formalen Or-
ganisationen, in INDIVIDUELLE VERANTWORTUNG UND BETEILIGUNGSVERHALTNISSE BEI
STRAFTATEN IN BIOROKRATISCHEN ORGANISATIONEN DES STAATES, DER WIRTSCHAFT UND
DER GESELLSCHAFr 33, 36 (Knut Amelung ed., 2000).
135. Roxin, supra note 122, at 207; ROxIN, TT, supra note 105, at 252.
136. Ambos relies on few cases decided by the Peruvian courts and the ICC to ar-
gue that the criterion can be applied even to less formal non state groups, but does not
cite any independent arguments to support his conclusion: Ambos, supra note 124, at
150. Compare with Stefano Manacorda & Chantal Meloni, Indirect Perpetration ver-
sus Joint Criminal Enterprise: Concurring Approaches in the Practice of International
Criminal Law?, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159, 171 (2011).
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5. Fungibility of the Act Intermediaries
Commentators have been highly critical of the criterion of fungi-
bility, which forms a central part of Roxin's theory. It is argued that
the expectation of automatic implementation of the elements of the
offense by the intermediaries contradicts holding them criminally re-
sponsible as direct perpetrators. 137 The assumption of soulless
humans is also contested; even in the most tightly controlled struc-
ture, the fundamental unpredictability of freely acting humans
cannot be done away with. Organisationsherrschaft presents us with
a crooked picture of humans who are merged into an organizational
structure and become one with the machine. Just because some or all
of the individuals are replaceable, however, does not make the enter-
prise any less a union of human beings, or lessen the imponderability
of the result that follows. If the image of the soulless power apparatus
is taken seriously, it is hard to see why this does not at the same time
justify relieving the act executors from criminal responsibility.13 8
These internal contradictions of a criminally responsible yet ma-
chine-like direct executor can be partially resolved if one
distinguishes more clearly between individual and collective unlaw-
fulness-that is, unlawfulness that arises in organizational
settings.s39 Unlike in the normal case of indirect perpetration where
the responsibility of the Hintermann is based on his direct control
over the direct perpetrator, in cases of macro-criminality, the
Hintermann controls the intermediary only indirectly through the
mechanism of the organizational apparatus.1 40 The direct perpetra-
tor is, on the one hand, responsible for his own criminal acts; on the
other hand, his actions are part of the acts of the organization as a
whole. This organizational aspect does not relieve him as an individ-
ual for the individual unlawfulness. However, the only person who
can be held responsible for this organizational unlawfulness is the
person who has control over the organization-the Hintermann.141
This response is particularly relevant in the context of international
crimes. It signals that principles of attribution may be different in
cases of individual and collective criminality. It nevertheless fails to
address the troubling aspect of viewing the direct perpetrator as a
soulless tool of the Hintermann.
This objection is connected to the second set of arguments
against fungibility: in the context of the concrete act, there are only a
limited number of act intermediaries. For instance, in the case of the
137. Otto, supra note 126, at 755.
138. Uwe Murmann, Tatherrschaft durch Weisungsmacht, GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIV
FOR STRAFRECHT 269, 273-74 (1996).
139. Ambos, supra note 126, at 234; see also Ambos, supra note 124, at 148.
140. Ambos, supra note 126, at 234; see also Ambos, supra note 124, at 148.
141. Rene Bloy, Grenzen der Thterschaft bei fremdhandiger Tatausfthrung,
GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIV FMR STRAFRECHT 424, 441 (1996).
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border guards posted between East and West Germany, in the
context of the concrete act of preventing the escape of refugees, only a
few soldiers were present.142 At best then, the soldiers were not in-
stantly but only successively replaceable. This would not differ in any
material way from other forms of indirect perpetration or guarantee
automatic implementation of the elements of the concrete offense.143
One response to this objection is to consider that control over the
"act" has a different meaning in the context of Organisationsherr-
schaft. In the usual case of indirect perpetration, the "act" represents
the direct criminal act committed by the Frontmann. In Organisa-
tionsherrschaft, the "act" may be taken to refer to the entire
expiration of events leading to the fulfillment of the result of the ele-
ments of the offense. The Hintermann would thus have the central
position if he controls the sequence of events till the implementation
of the crime.144 However, this would result in a decoupling of the
domination over the act from the elements of the offense. If Roxin
were to accept this solution, it would contradict his stance that the
perpetrator must have the key position in the execution action consti-
tuting the elements of the offense.145
This objection may not, however, apply with the same strength in
the case of international crimes. This is because international of-
fenses have an inbuilt collective element in their definition-a crime
against humanity is not an individual act of murder or rape; such
individual acts reach the level of an international crime only if they
are part of a widespread or systematic practice. The Hintermann can
thus only be someone who occupies the central position in this entire
sequence of events, including the collective element of the crime. To
decouple his involvement from each micro crime that comprises this
group crime would still not result in a detachment from the elements
of the offense.
6. Detachedness from the Legal Order
Roxin limits the operation of Organisationsherrschaft to organi-
zations that are detached from the legal order, for it is only in these
organizations that the administration and execution organs of the
power apparatus are not bound to laws that have a higher ranking.
The latter would normally exclude the automatic implementation of
the Hintermann's illegal instructions. This criterion is challenged pri-
marily by Ambos, who argues that if the organization forms part of
142. Murmann, supra note 138, at 273.
143. Ambos, supra note 126, at 232.
144. Thomas Rotsch, Neues zur Organisationsherrschaft, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
STRAFRECHT 13, 15-16 (2005). Other authors have suggested that Roxin's theory in
fact does not explain domination over any particular act at all, but only over the end
result. See Weigend, supra note 129, at 100 and references therein.
145. Rotsch, supra note 144, at 15-16.
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the legal order, the Hintermann's domination over the act is even
greater.146 For instance, non-State power apparatuses which have a
symbiotic relationship with the State, such as the Sicilian mafia or
Colombian drug cartels, are not detached from the law, but inte-
grated into it in order to achieve a common interest. This does not
change anything in the effective domination of the top management
of the apparatus over the act and direct executors.147 Ambos is guilty
here of eliding the distinction between the government and the
"State"-a symbiotic relationship between the former and the organi-
zation cannot be equated with an integration of the organization
within the positive legal order which may still be committed to fight-
ing the organization's criminal acts.
Ambos is more careful of this distinction when discussing state
organized power apparatuses, where the legal order forms the basis
of state sanctioned crime, such as in the military dictatorships of Ar-
gentina and Chile, and crimes are perpetrated in the name of the law
by the authority of the executive and through the instrumentality of
the courts. Here, there is no element of detachedness from the law;
instead, with the concentration of unlawfulness and the authority of
the law in the hands of the same national power apparatus, the auto-
matic implementation of the illegal instruction by the act
intermediary is even more assured than in a case of law
detachedness. 148
Ambos admits that "law" in Roxin's sense can also refer to natu-
ral rather than positive law; the state apparatus may act in violation
of the natural law even if it is in conformity with the positive law. He
rejects this interpretation though, on the ground that it is too ab-
stract and that such unwritten supra legal principles cannot be
readily understood by the act executor. Thus, they cannot form a nor-
mative barrier to the execution of the Hintermann's orders.' 49
Ambos's criticism on law detachedness is convincing in the con-
text of a state apparatus if Roxin indeed takes law to mean positive
law. It is not clear, however, in what sense Roxin uses the term. In a
later article,150 Roxin attempts to dispel two main, mistaken inter-
pretations of this element: first, he claims that the organization need
not operate outside the law in every case, but merely in those areas
where the crimes are committed; second, the criterion must be as-
sessed not from the point of view of the law in operation in the
criminal systems, but from that of the current law. Using this reason-
ing, he concludes that even if some of the measures undertaken by
the GDR regime were in accordance with the law, shooting to prevent
146. Ambos, supra note 126, at 242.
147. Id., at 242-43.
148. Id., at 244.
149. Id., at 244-45.
150. Roxin, supra note 128.
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flights across the border between East and West Germany was
clearly detached from the law.' 5 1 This is not a particularly convincing
explication of the criterion. It is difficult to see why the law currently
in force should be the guiding feature for assessing the organization's
previous activities, and even if it is, whether that is limited to the
domestic law of the State where the crimes are committed, or if it also
includes international law. Moreover, the certitude with which Roxin
is able to state that the shootings at the border were undisputed in-
stances of this law-detachedness, and to do so without any reference
to any positive law, seems to point more in the direction of some no-
tion of "natural law." Roxin's earlier references to a "higher ranking"
of this law' 5 2 and to the rarity of such an organization existing in a
constitutionally stable legal order' 5 3 also support such an
interpretation.
This may in fact be one of the major strengths rather than weak-
nesses of Roxin's theory when applied to international crimes. It is
exactly because an act executor who operates under the ideological
glare that surrounds mass atrocity cannot immediately comprehend
such unwritten higher laws, that they do not present a barrier to him
for executing the Hintermann's illegal instructions. Roxin's criterion
of law detachedness would then perform two very important func-
tions in clarifying the basis for international criminal responsibility:
it would capture the social context in which mass crimes are commit-
ted; at the same time, it would provide a moral compass for the
behavior expected of the executor when surrounded by a climate that
sanctions horrific acts of brutality.
V. THE CONTROL THEORY AT THE ICC
Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC defines the perpe-
trator as the person who commits a crime, "whether as an individual,
jointly with another or through another person, regardless of
whether that other person is criminally responsible."
Prior to Judge Wyngaert's eloquent Opinion in Katanga, the con-
trol theory seemed poised to become the dominant interpretation of
this Article and the basis for perpetration responsibility at the
ICC.15 4 The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, in particular, endorsed
the theory in a string of decisions dealing with the confirmation of
151. Id., at 298.
152. Roxin, supra note 122, at 204; ROxIN, TT, supra note 105, at 249.
153. Roxin, supra note 122, at 207; ROXIN, TT, supra note 105, at 252.
154. Judge Fulford also rejects the control theory and the doctrine of co-perpetra-
tion on which it is based in the Lubanga Trial Judgment: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2482, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, Separate
Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford (ICC Trial Chamber I, Mar. 14, 2012). It is difficult
though to predict to what extent their objections will influence the development of the
theories at the ICC.
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charges against the accused and spelt out the elements of co-perpe-
tration and indirect perpetration based on the control doctrine. 55
In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial Chamber specified the objective and
subjective elements of co-perpetration, which have formed a template
for subsequent iterations of the elements. The objective elements con-
sist of, first, an agreement or a common plan between two or more
persons. This plan can be implicit and should include an element of
criminality, even though it need not be directed specifically at the
commission of a crime.156 The second objective element is coordinated
essential contribution by each perpetrator at any stage of the crime
resulting in the realization of the objective elements of the crime.157
The manner in which some of these elements have been fleshed
out, in particular in the Trial Chamber's first ever judgment in the
Lubanga case,158 give rise to some concerns. For instance, the Cham-
ber does not require that the common plan is intrinsically criminal,
as long as it includes an element of criminality, i.e., its implementa-
tion should embody "a sufficient risk that, if events follow the
ordinary course, a crime will be committed."159 As Ambos argues, this
is an unnecessarily confused formulation which does not sufficiently
exclude the possibility of a plan that is predominantly non-criminal
and that does not necessarily include a concrete crime.160 The Cham-
ber also vacillates between an objective and a subjective risk
requirement. Initially, it emphasizes that under Article 30 of the
155. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges [[ 330-41 (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 29, 2007); Prose-
cutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Sept. 30, 2008); Prosecutor v. Bemba
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
349 (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, June 15, 2009); Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Case No.
ICC-02/05-02/09, Corrigendum of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 1 152
(ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Feb. 8, 2010); Prosecutor v. Abdallan Banda and Saleh
Jerbo, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Corrigendum of the Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges 126 (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Mar. 7, 2011); Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey
and Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision of the Confirmation of Charges Pursu-
ant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 1 291 (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II,
Jan. 23, 2012); Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11,
Decision of the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute 296 (ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, Jan. 23, 2012);
156. Lubanga, supra note 155, at [[ 343-45; Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note
155, at I 522-23; Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 155, at I 399-400;
Banda and Jerbo, supra note 155, at 129-35; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note
155, at IT 301-04; Abu Garda, supra note 155, at [ 160, 163-32.
157. Lubanga, supra note 155, at [[ 346-48; Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note
155, at [ 524-26; Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 155, at Il 401-406;
Banda and Jerbo, supra note 155, at I[ 136-49; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note
155, at 1$[ 305-312; Abu Garda, supra note 155, at l1[ 160, 180-232.
158. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 154.
159. Id., at 1l 984-87.
160. Kai Ambos, The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecu-
tor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues, 12 INT'L. CRIM. L. REV.
115, 139-40 (2012).
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Rome Statute which defines intent, the co-perpetrators must be (sub-
jectively) aware of the risk that the implementation of the plan will
result in the crime.' 61 This is undoubtedly the correct approach, but
is diluted in subsequent formulations where it is replaced by the (ob-
jective) requirement that the plan's implementation "will result in
the commission of the relevant crime in the ordinary course of
events."162
The Trial Chamber also affirms the second objective element of
co-ordinated essential contribution by the co-perpetrators. 63 The
Pre-Trial Chamber had been criticized for inferring Lubanga's re-
sponsibility for the crime of recruitment of child soldiers from the fact
of his essential role in the common plan between him and some mili-
tary leaders of the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo
(FPLC) to broaden the base of their army.164 The Pre-Trial Chamber
had thus omitted to clarify what it deems as the object of essential
contribution-the specific crime or the common plan. The Trial
Chamber also fails to resolve the ambiguity in the object of the essen-
tial contribution. It merely states that the accused must have
provided an "essential contribution to the common plan that resulted
in the commission of the relevant crime."165 A strict construction of
this standard would imply that the accused's contribution need not be
essential for the crime itself. The factual assessment by the Chamber
also pays far greater attention to Lubanga's overall role in the UPC/
FPLC and lays insufficient emphasis on how it was additionally es-
sential to the recruitment of the child soldiers,166 which should have
formed the main focus of the analysis.
The subjective elements of co-perpetration were also first laid
down in the Pre-Trial Chamber's Lubanga decision, but there has
been a significant amount of controversy about the requirements in
subsequent decisions. According to the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber,
the first subjective element is the accused's fulfillment of all subjec-
tive elements of the crime with which he is charged, including the
specific intent for crimes such as genocide.' 67 The second subjective
161. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 154, at 986.
162. Id., at 1018, also 1 1136. Indeed, Wirth argues that the Chamber replaces
the subjective risk requirement with an objective one. See Steffen Wirth, Co-Perpetra-
tion in the Lubanga Trial Judgment,10 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 971, 986 (2012).
163. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 154, at 11 999-1000, 1003-05.
164. See Lubanga, supra note 155, at 377. The FPLC is the military wing of a
political group in the DRC called the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). For criticism
of this inference, see Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake of Law and Co-Perpetration in
the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 6 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 471, 486-87
(2008).
165. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 154, at IT 1006, 1018.
166. Id., at 1270-71.
167. Lubanga, supra note 155, at I 349-60. See also Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra
note 155, at IT 527-32; Bemba, supra note 155, at 351; Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali,
supra note 155, at I 410-17; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, at IT 333, 338-
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element is that all co-perpetrators must be mutually aware of and
accept that the execution of the common plan may result in the reali-
zation of the objective elements of the crime. If there is a substantial
likelihood that the objective elements of the crime would occur, this
mutual acceptance can be inferred from the co-perpetrators' aware-
ness of this likelihood and their decision to nonetheless implement
the plan. If, on the other hand, the risk is low, the co-perpetrators
must have expressly accepted thatimplementing the plan would re-
sult in the realization of the objective elements of the crime.168 The
third subjective factor is the accused's awareness of the factual cir-
cumstances enabling him to jointly control the crime. 169
The second subjective element outlined by the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber is unconvincing for several reasons. The Chamber infers that the
co-perpetrators mutually accept that the execution of the plan may
result in the realization of the objective elements of the crime in low-
risk cases from their express acceptance of this result.170 As an exam-
ple of this express acceptance, the Chamber points to when "killing is
committed with 'manifest indifference to the value of human life"'; on
the other hand, intent is absent when the actor perceives a non-sub-
stantial risk but believes that his expertise will prevent the
realization of the offense.171 It is difficult, however, to see how "mani-
fest indifference" in the first case can imply "acceptance" of the
victim's death, apart from treating this as an acceptance of the risk of
death (which in the Chamber's formulation is not sufficient to prove
intent in low-risk cases). In contrast, one could say in the second case
that the actor "accepts the risk" and is simply mistaken about his
ability to prevent the risk, the level of his expertise, or both.'72
The second element as defined by the Lubanga Pre-Trial Cham-
ber also incorporates the mens rea of dolus eventualis which is
47; Abu Garda, supra note 155, at $ 161; Banda and Jerbo, supra note 155, at 150-
57.
168. Lubanga, supra note 155, at $ 361-65; Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note
155, at T$ 533-37.
169. Lubanga, supra note 155, at 1 366-67; Bemba, supra note 155, at 351;
Banda and Jerbo, supra note 155, at $ 150, 160-61; Abu Garda, supra note 155, at 9T
161. The last subjective element has mostly been dropped by Pre-Trial Chamber Con-
firmation Decisions which combine co-perpetration and indirect perpetration into
indirect co-perpetration as a mode of responsibility. In this new formulation, the last
subjective element for indirect co-perpetration is that the perpetrator must be aware
of the factual circumstances that enable him to exercise joint control over the crime's
commission through another person. See Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155, at 91
533-37; Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 155, at $ 410; Ruto, Kosgey and
Sang, supra note 155, at 1 292. The Lubanga Trial Chamber mentions it (Lubanga
Judgment, supra note 154, at 1 1008) but does not finally apply the standard
(Lubanga Judgment, supra note 154, at 9 1013): see Ambos, First Judgment, supra
note 160, at 148.
170. See Lubanga, supra note 155, at 9 354 n.436, quoting Stakic, Case No IT-97-
24-T, Trial Judgment at 1 587.
171. See Lubanga, supra note 155, at 1 355 n.437.
172. See Weigend, supra note 164, at 483.
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unlikely to meet the "intent" and "knowledge" test required under Ar-
ticle 30 of the Rome Statute and has subsequently been rejected.173
Thus, the co-perpetrators must "know the existence of a risk that the
consequence will occur," that is, they must be aware that the conse-
quence will occur "in the ordinary course of events."' 74 This is clearly
the more logical interpretation of Article 3017r and a more suitable
subjective requirement for co-perpetration liability under the Rome
Statute.
In the decision on confirmation of charges in Katanga and
Ngudjolo, the Pre-Trial Chamber focused on the elements of liability
for joint perpetration through another person and combined the doc-
trines of "co-perpetration" and "indirect perpetration" to form
"indirect co-perpetration" as a mode of liability.'76 It then set out the
objective elements for perpetration by means, focusing specifically on
the doctrine of Organisationsherrschaft.177 These elements have been
reiterated in subsequent Pre-Trial Chamber Confirmation of Charges
decisions.178
The first element consists of the perpetrator's control over the
organization.179 The second element is the existence of an organized
and hierarchical apparatus of power.180 The organization must in-
clude a sufficient number of fungible subordinates to ensure manifest
compliance with orders that lead to the commission of crimes. The
leader must exercise authority through means such as his power to
hire, train, discipline, and provide resources to his subordinates to
secure this control.' 8 '
The interpretation of this element has posed some difficulties in
the Kenya Confirmation of Charges decisions.182 In the Ruto, Kogsey
and Sang Confirmation Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber upheld the
173. Bemba, supra note 155, at 1 352-70. See also Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra
note 155, at J1 334-36; Banda and Jerbo, supra note 155, at 1 159; Lubanga Judg-
ment, supra note 154, at 1011.
174. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 154, at 1012.
175. See also Ambos, supra note 160, at 149-50.
176. Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155, at 490-93; see also Ruto, Kosgey
and Sang, supra note 155, at 287, 289; Abu Garda, supra note 155, at 156-57. See
Weigend, supra note 129, at 110 (stating that there is nothing novel about this mode
of liability which is merely a combination of two accepted modes of perpetration).
177. See Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155, at 91 495-99.
178. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 155, at 407-10; Ruto, Kosgey and
Sang, supra note 155, at 1 313-32.
179. See Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155, at 1 500-10; Muthaura, Keny-
atta and Ali, supra note 155, at % 407-10; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, at
%$ 313-32.
180. Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155, at %T 511-14; Muthaura, Kenyatta
and Ali, supra note 155, at 1 408; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, at %% 313-
17.
181. Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155, at 1 514, citing RoxIN, TATERSCHAFT
UND TATHERRSCHArT at 245; BGHSt 40, 218, 236.
182. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 155, at 9 408-09, 191-213; Ruto,
Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, at 9 315, 197, 315.
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Prosecution's contention that William Ruto had control over an or-
ganization called the "Network"183 which was used to carry out
attacks against civilians who were perceived supporters of the Party
of National Unity (PNU) in Kenya.184
This characterization of the "Network" as an organization was
challenged by Judge Kaul. Though his dissent focused on whether the
jurisdictional requirements of a crime against humanity are met if
the crimes are not committed pursuant to the policy of a State or "or-
ganization," 85 his factual conclusions are also pertinent to assessing
whether the Network would satisfy the objective element of Or-
ganisationsherrschaft. In Judge Kaul's assessment, the Network was
an ad hoc "ethnically based gathering of perpetrators" that was cre-
ated for the sole purpose of assisting the ethnic community's political
aspirations during Kenya's 2007 presidential elections. An "amor-
phous alliance" of "co-ordinating members of a tribe with a
predisposition towards violence with fluctuating membership" was
not transformed into an organization merely by having planned and
co-ordinated violence during a series of meetings.18 6 This is a persua-
sive objection to the characterization of the Network as an
"organization" which would be equally valid in rejecting it as satisfy-
ing the second objective element for indirect perpetration.
The third element is execution of the crimes through "automatic"
compliance with orders.' 87 This automatic compliance may not only
be derived from the fungibility of the direct perpetrator, but can also
be achieved through intensive and violent training regimens for sub-
ordinates.' 88 Additional methods of securing automatic compliance
with orders, such as swearing an oath of fealty, use of disciplinary
measures, and payment and punishment mechanisms, have been
identified in the Kenya Confirmation of Charges decisions.189
183. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, at IT 307-09, 316-332.
184. Id., at 1 207, 216.
185. Id., Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, at 1 8-13.
186. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-
Peter Kaul, at 8-13; see also Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, Case No. ICC-
01/09-01/11-2, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-Trial Chamber
II's Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for William
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosegey and Joshua Arap Sang 1 18-49 (ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber II, Mar. 15, 2011).
187. See Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155, at f 515-18; Muthaura, Kenyatta
and Ali, supra note 155, at 1 409-10; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, at 1
313-32.
188. Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155 at 1 518. This addition to the element
of fungibility is not found in the original German doctrine: see Weigend, supra note
129, at 107 (critical of this position, stating that the Chamber may have found it nec-
essary to adapt the doctrine to suit the exigencies of mass atrocity in Africa); for a
more positive interpretation, see van der Wilt, supra note 13, at 312 (arguing that this
new element introduces flexibility in the doctrine).
189. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, supra note 155, at 1 408, 208-13; Ruto, Kosgey
and Sang, supra note 155, at $ 317-31.
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VI. TOWARDS A THEORY OF PERPETRATION FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
A. Analogies and Lessons from Domestic Criminal Law
At first glance, English criminal law does not appear to offer
much scope for an expansive concept of principalship that would en-
compass the liability of several perpetrators for a collective crime.
The basic assumption for perpetrator liability is that the perpetrator
directly and immediately fulfills the definitional elements of the of-
fense' 90 and it is difficult to establish this condition for international
crimes. English law also makes it difficult to trace the chain of causa-
tion from the immediate physical perpetrator to the mastermind
behind the crime such that the latter can be held responsible as a
principal despite, and in addition to, the criminal responsibility of the
former.19 1 It does provide for exceptions to these premises in the form
of the doctrines of innocent and semi-innocent agency.192 It does not,
however, address situations of mass criminality where there may be
several thousand immediate perpetrators and tracing liability back
to the policy level perpetrator using a simple one-to-one causation
analysis (leader D "caused" the actions of immediate perpetrators A,
B, C, D, .. .) will be very difficult. Moreover, it does not contemplate
situations where this high level perpetrator may not know of the ex-
act identity of his so called "agent" or have any contact with him.
Neither does it capture the distinctive aspects of mass criminality: its
collective nature and the climate of moral permissiveness that en-
courages or endorses this conduct. The reason for this paucity is
partly the much greater emphasis given to the doctrines of conspiracy
and joint criminal enterprise as modes of accounting for collective ac-
tion. These are inchoate and accessorial forms of liability though, and
themselves rest on questionable foundations.
German criminal law theory on perpetration, on the other hand,
attempts to accommodate these aspects of international crimes. The
emphasis on the concept of "control" rather than causation and the
perpetrator as the Zentralgestalt based either on his functional con-
trol over the act (co-perpetration) or his control over the will of the
direct perpetrator (indirect perpetration) opens up the possibility of
holding several people simultaneously responsible as principals.
While English law also recognizes the concept of joint principals, be-
cause of its exacting conditions for causation and the requirement
that the perpetrator must personally fulfill at least some part of the
actus reus,193 the scope for perpetrator responsibility is much
narrower.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
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German criminal law also recognizes the concept of the "perpe-
trator behind the perpetrator" in ways that are pertinent for
international crimes. For instance, in the Cat King case, the
Hintermann's domination over the act was grounded on the intensity
of his effect on the Vordermann and in his inducement and exploita-
tion of the latter's mistake of law.19 4 This could prima facie apply to
the relationship between the high level and physical participants in
mass atrocity where the leader induces and exploits the physical per-
petrators' belief that the crime is necessary and permissible. We
would still need to establish, however, how this influence and effect
can occur if the parties were never in contact.
Even more significant than these concepts is the category of Or-
ganisationsherrschaft which recognizes that individuals in leadership
positions can be held responsible as perpetrators of crimes that are
committed by a very large number of anonymous and exchangeable
physical perpetrators. 1 9 5 Roxin's criterion of detachedness from the
law is also sensitive to the perversion of norms that makes these
crimes possible.196 The doctrine's shortcomings lie in its treatment of
the character of the physical perpetrator as a soulless automaton. It
also oversimplifies to the point of caricature, the conditions under
which mass atrocity occurs: a vertical, tautly-structured hierarchical
organization is simply non-existent in most cases of international
crimes.
Despite these reservations, Organisationsherrschaft addresses
several of our intuitions about mass atrocity and provides a promis-
ing template around which one can construct a theory of perpetration
for international crimes. This is, for instance, true of Schroeder's ob-
servation that the Hintermann should be liable as a perpetrator
because he deliberately inflames the passions of the intermediary
and uses him as a tool to achieve criminal results.197 This is certainly
one part of the reality of how high level perpetrators can harness or-
dinary people to physically commit the crimes which they have set in
motion. The BGH's version of Organisationsherrschaft also empha-
sizes the carefully planned, culpable actions of the Hintermann: his
liability hinges on the conscious creation and utilization of the basic
framework conditions of an organizational structure that result in
the realization of an offense. In both cases, the focus is, as Roxin
states (though not quite for the same argument), on the
Hintermann's ability to unleash destruction on a scale that far ex-
ceeds that of an ordinary instigator.198 Though the language of the
194. MPICC report, supra note 98, at 22.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 122-123.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 146-153.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 125-126.
198. Claus Roxin, Anmerkungen zum Vortrag von Prof Dr. Herzberg, in IN-
DIVIDUELLE VERANTWORTUNG uND BETEILIGUNGSVERHALTNISSE BEI STRAFTATEN IN
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law can scarcely accommodate an element as vague as "destructive
potential" in its lexicon, it is an important observation to be kept in
mind while constructing our theory of perpetration.
The other important insight of Organisationsherrschaft is the
distinction between individual and collective unlawfulness. The
Hintermann's criminal responsibility is derived from organizational
unlawfulness rather than the act of any single perpetrator. 99 This
obviates the problem of having to trace the chain of causation from
each physical perpetrator's individual act of murder to the overall
genocidal enterprise in which the Hintermann occupies a leadership
position. It also circumvents the contradiction in holding the
Hintermann liable despite a criminally responsible intermediary. It
offers the closest domestic analogue to the uniquely collective dimen-
sion of international crimes.
The ICC, as discussed earlier, has already attempted to combine
Organisationsherrschaft with the concept of co-perpetration for at-
tributing responsibility to high and mid-level perpetrators. It would
be useful to consider whether some promising aspects of Organisa-
tionsherrschaft can indeed be taken together with certain aspects of
co-perpetration in German criminal law in developing a doctrine of
perpetration for situations of mass atrocity.
B. A Theory of Perpetration for International Crimes
1. Responsibility Based on the Concept of Control
a. Rationale and framework
The conception of the perpetrator of a crime as the Zentralgestalt
in the course of events constituting the offense is a powerful starting
point for a theory of perpetrator responsibility: it accords with our
intuitions to assign perpetrator responsibility to an individual whose
contribution to the offense pushes him in the very center of its occur-
rence. We then need to fill this concept of the Zentralgestalt with
content to discover what conditions would qualify for holding some-
one responsible as a perpetrator.
Mass atrocity cannot, strictly speaking, be "controlled" by any
one individual; the spontaneity, initiative, and arbitrariness dis-
played by mid and low level participants that is characteristic of
mass atrocity200 precludes a scenario where any one individual has
the last and final say on whether the international crime will occur.
Instead, we must shift the focus to control over what is truly central
to their commission-control over the unleashing of a destructive po-
BOROKRATISCHEN ORGANISATIONEN DES STAATES, DER WIRTSCHAFT UND DER GESELL-
scHAFT (Knut Amelung Hrsg., 2000), at 55, 56.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 139-141.
200. OSIEL, supra note 20, at 98-104.
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tential that can lead to the commission of mass atrocity and is
intended to do so. Osiel's metaphor of the culpable village watch-
maker who constructs a clock, attaches a bomb to it, and then walks
away so that detonation occurs much later201 is over simplified, but
nonetheless instructive here in identifying some important features
of where the crux of the action lies in mass atrocity. By assembling
and winding up the clock, the watchmaker sets into motion a process
that results in the explosion and the harm arising from it. He will
thus be responsible for it, even if he does not know the exact identity
of the potential victims or the manner in which they would be
harmed.202
For cases of mass atrocity, Osiel's metaphor helps us look for the
central figure in their occurrence, away from the time and place of
the concrete crime, and to the scene where the machinery for their
operationalization was set up. The Zentralgestalt in an international
crime is the person who sets this entire machinery in motion and
utilizes it in order to achieve the criminal results he intends, or
knows, will occur. The significance of this position has been acknowl-
edged, albeit in a different context, by most analysts of genocide and
ethnic cleansing203 and lies at the heart of what commentators such
as Schroeder and Roxin are concerned about: the potential for de-
struction possessed by the Hintermann. This potential can exist by
virtue of his leadership position, charisma, or de facto authority over
a large number of biddable individuals, and his conscious creation
and manipulation of a situation204 that results in tremendous harm.
b. Objective/actus reus elements
The objective elements for perpetration responsibility that I out-
line here can be accommodated within the definition of perpetration
under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. They borrow in some re-
spects from the concept of Organisationsherrschaft but with
substantial modifications to suit the specific circumstances of mass
atrocity. As we discussed above, the Zentralgestalt in an interna-
tional crime is the person who creates and sets into motion or utilizes
the process which results in the commission of mass atrocity. Follow-
ing this rationale, I identify the first objective element as the
perpetrator's "control over the act" by virtue of his conscious creation,
operationalization or utilization of the framework conditions of the
process that results in the realization of the international crime.
Thus, the actus reus consists of the accused's creation or manipula-
201. Id., at 104.
202. Id., at 104.
203. See, e.g., id., at 104.
204. See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATaocrry, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
25-26 (2007) and references therein.
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tion of the apparatus that results in the realization of the elements of
a crime within the jurisdiction of the court. This may encompass a
series of activities ranging from formulating a plan, deciding on the
mode of its execution, setting up a framework to achieve the intended
outcome, and ordering subordinates to ensure its implementation.
Several clarifications are in order here. First, instead of the di-
rect individual criminal act committed by the physical perpetrator,
hegemony over the "act" here must be taken to mean control over the
sequence of events leading to the result of the elements of the offense.
The perpetrator would thus have the central position if he controls
the sequence of events till the implementation of the international
crime.205 Second, this "control" is not based on the law's absolution of
the physical perpetrator from criminal liability. Neither does it re-
flect that he has the "last and final say" over whether the crime will
occur. Instead, we must shift the temporal focus of the control from
the conduct that immediately precedes the commission of the crime to
the conduct which results in the events leading to the mass crime.
The "control" is based on the perpetrator's creation or manipula-
tion of the apparatus that results in mass atrocity. This does not
imply that the apparatus he sets up or exploits must and can only
result in the commission of an international crime. Rather, there
must be a high degree of certainty, greater than that present in ordi-
nary cases of instigation, that the crime intended will occur. The
perpetrator's control will stem from the intensity of the effect of his
conduct 2 0 6 over the destructive machinery of violence. Quite often,
this will be based on his occupying a position of some authority
within the apparatus that initiates or fuels mass atrocity.
Second, there must exist an operational framework or apparatus
which the perpetrator either establishes or uses through which he
can set in motion the events that result in the commission of the
crime. The perpetrator must occupy a position within, or in relation
to, this apparatus which enables him to harness its potential to
achieve the criminal result. This apparatus need not, however, be
vertically structured or rigidly hierarchical. Informal networks of
power with weak links may sometimes be more useful for the com-
mission of international crimes than tautly structured
apparatuses. 207 Neither is it necessary that each individual physical
perpetrator is part of the apparatus. The individual micro crimes
committed by the direct perpetrators which comprise the interna-
tional crime, however, must be related, in more than a de minimis
way, to the activities of this operational framework. For instance,
205. See supra text accompanying notes 144-145 and text following note 145.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 124.
207. OSIEL, supra note 20, at 115. This would obviate the problem identified in the
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Confirmation Decision: see supra text accompanying notes 185
to 186.
868 [Vol. 61
2013] INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MASS ATROCITY
consider a situation where X, belonging to ethnic group A, kills his
neighbor Y, who is a member of ethnic group B, because he covets his
property. This crime is, however, committed within a context where
the public radio, owned by the government comprised of members of
A, exhorts all members of A to eliminate all members of B. Militia
members supported by the government distribute weapons in X's vil-
lage, print pamphlets with incendiary messages targeting group B,
and make public lists of all the residents of the village belonging to B.
X is also conscious that members of B are being routinely killed with
the approval of, or at least without fear of sanction by, the govern-
ment. In this situation, the operational framework or apparatus will
consist of the network of militia, media, and governmental entities
that members of A utilize to encourage and perpetrate violence
against members of B. The killing of Y will be related in more than a
de minimis sense to the network of militia and state policy that sanc-
tions the elimination of group B.
The third objective element is the existence of circumstances
such that the individual crime conforms to the prevailing social norm.
This element admittedly goes beyond a simple assessment of the re-
sponsibility of the individual defendant before the court and involves
the court in ascertaining the veracity of complicated historical, social,
and political facts. It is this element, however, that makes interna-
tional crimes distinct from their domestic counterpart. Moreover, it is
this perversion of norms that lends the high level perpetrator his de-
structive potential. It makes the commission of the individual crimes
by ordinary people far more likely than in a situation where these
acts are condemned by the moral and social climate, and the individ-
ual must overcome his scruples in acting against them. This does not
mean that the positive legal order in the state where these crimes are
committed must endorse them. There can be a formal commitment to
fighting crime in a state despite the crimes being encouraged, or-
dered, or tolerated by the government in practice. Neither does it
imply that the sanction for the crimes must come only from the gov-
ernment or the state. There can be a "para-state"or a state within a
state that is based on achieving these criminal aims. This could even
be constituted by rebel groups that enjoy a great deal of authority or
power over significant portions of the population in the state where
these crimes are committed.
c. Subjective/mens rea elements
The subjective elements for perpetrator liability are quite close to
those required for indirect perpetration in German criminal law and
elaborated by the ICC in its adoption of Organisationsherrschaft in
its decision on the confirmation of charges in Katanga and
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Ngudjolo.208 The perpetrator must have a "double intent"-that is,
he must have intent with respect to the elements of the offense in
question as well as in relation to the elements that enable him to
establish his control over the "act." Thus, he must fulfill the mens rea
elements for each individual crime with which he is charged. This
part of the mental element could be included within the definition of
the crime (as is the case with the definition of genocide in all interna-
tional instruments) or it may be included within a separate provision
that applies to all the crimes which fall within the jurisdiction of the
international tribunal in question (as in Article 30 of the Rome Stat-
ute of the ICC). In addition, he must be aware of the circumstances
that enable him to create and utilize the framework conditions which
result in the commission of the crimes. For instance, he must have
knowledge of his position or authority that allows him to harness this
apparatus for the ends he desires, and the atmosphere of moral per-
missibility for the crimes he wants.
2. Organisationsherrschaft Combined with Co-perpetration
Mass atrocity often involves several individuals in leadership po-
sitions acting together to achieve the criminal results they desire. In
these cases, the issue of whether the conduct of the other high level
perpetrators can be mutually attributed in a manner such that they
are all equally and jointly responsible for all the crimes committed by
each one of them becomes relevant. The ICC recognized this possibil-
ity in its Confirmation of Charges decisions by combining the
doctrine of co-perpetration with the doctrine of Organisationsherr-
schaft in order to achieve this mutual attribution.209 The new version
of Organisationsherrschaft can also be employed alongside the doc-
trine of co-perpetration to achieve the same result. While the
subjective elements have been spelt out relatively clearly, the objec-
tive elements merit further clarification:
(i) The element of a common plan requires mutual consent over
the joint realization of the act, including acceptance or approval of an
already formed plan. The co-perpetrators must work together jointly
based on a division of labor towards the implementation of the plan
with the (subjective) awareness of the risk that this will result in the
commission of the crime. The plan cannot be predominantly non-
criminal, and must include the commission of a concrete crime.
(ii) The act contribution of each co-perpetrator must be of suffi-
cient weight and importance such that it grounds the necessary co-
domination over the act. This essential contribution must then exist
for each individual international crime with which the accused is
208. Katanga and Ngudjolo, supra note 155.
209. See id., at 1 519-20; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, supra note 155, at 287, 289;
Abu Garda, supra note 155, at T1 156-57.
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charged (the crime of recruitment of child soldiers in the Lubanga
decision) rather than simply to the common plan (broadening the
base of the army). While this contribution may be at the preparation
stage, it must be of sufficient importance so that the lack of act imme-
diacy is compensated for by the weight of the contribution. Further,
even if the accused participates in the execution of the plan after it
has already begun, based on a mutual understanding and with the
necessary act domination through his essential functional contribu-
tion, he will be responsible as a co-perpetrator. This is particularly
relevant in the context of international crimes which may be spread
over several years and involve several changes in top level personnel.
VII. CONCLUSION
The modified version of Organisationsherrschaft hat I have pro-
posed here is a new form of perpetration responsibility for
international crimes that engages with domestic criminal law princi-
ples while simultaneously capturing the unique features of
international crimes. It assumes that principles of criminal responsi-
bility developed in the domestic criminal law context are salient for
international crimes. In this sense, there is no attempt to, as it were,
reinvent the wheel; I take the set of doctrinal justifications that have
guided the ascription of responsibility in these systems for granted
and make no claims to developing any alternative account of the the-
oretical foundations of criminal responsibility. At the same time,
rather than an indiscriminate commitment to any particular domes-
tic conceptualization of criminal responsibility, I use these divergent
justifications in the form of guideposts to develop an account of perpe-
tration for international crimes.
Though the specific elements of this new form of perpetration
constitutes a departure from settled principles of principal responsi-
bility in both German and English criminal law (and by extension
criminal law doctrine in other countries that borrow from these sys-
tems), they remain true to the fundamental concerns that guide the
allocation of criminal responsibility in both jurisdictions. At the same
time, I modify these principles to highlight the distinctive features of
international crimes. When combined with co-perpetration as out-
lined above, this new version of Organisationsherrschaft akes us
closer to an accurate picture of the role and function of high level
participants in international crimes and situates them in the political
context of mass atrocity perpetuated through the acts of several
thousands of anonymous individuals. It is also capable of adoption as
a theory of responsibility under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute
to hold an accused responsible for the commission of an international
crime.
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